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RECENT CASE NOTES
The Federal Court of Indiana in looking to see whether the judgment
was void where rendered, meets the further complication of whether the
Illinois rule or Federal rule is to govern. Probably it would apply the
Federal rule as to the kind of fraud that would make the judgment void
where rendered. First National Bank v. Liewer, 187 Fed. 16; Penn. R. R.
v. Hummel, 167 Fed. 89.
The fraud that was practiced seems to have been in obtaining the note,
the judgment apparently being regular in form. In similar circumstances
both Illinois and the Federal courts have refused collateral attack. Mus-
cantine v. Mo. R. R. Co., 1 Dill (U. S.) 536; Whitcomb v. Schultz, 223 Fed.
268, 13 C. C. A. 510; Hollester v. Sobra, 264 Ill. 535, 106 N. E. 507.
J. S. G.
PLEADING-APPEAL AND ERROR-THEORY OF THE CAsE-The complaint
alleged that the appellAnt was negligent in maintaining its rails so that
they were higher than the street at a place where vehicles were supposed
to cross them at an angle; that while the appellee was attempting to cross
at that point with his auto the auto was held on the tracks; that while it
was so held the appellant, by its servants, with knowledge of the appellee's
dangerous position negligently ran its street car against appellee's auto
and injured the appellee without making any effort to stop or to check the
speed of the car and avoid the collision. The instructions given charged
the jury that there could be a recovery if it was found that the track was
negligently maintained as alleged and that such negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the appellee's injury. The jury was also instructed that,
if it found that the appellant operated its street car in the manner alleged
in the complaint and that the conduct of the appellant in this reward was
the proximate cause of the appellee's injuries, then the jury would be
justified in finding for the appellee. There was a verdict and judgment
for the appellee and the appellant appealed. Held, reversed, and a new
trial ordered. The complaint was drawn upon the theory that the alleged
injuries were caused by two dependent, concurring acts of negligence com-
mitted by the appellant, viz., the negligent maintenance of the crossing
and the negligent operation of the street car, the proof of both of which
is necessary to entitle the appellee to a recovery. The instructions were
erroneous in that they departed from the theory of the complaint and
should not have been given. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Win-
stead, Appellate Court of Indiana, March 25, 1931, 175 N. E. 281.
In the course of the opinion it was said, "That a complaint must pro-
ceed on some definite theory, which must be adhered to throughout the
trigl and upon appeal, is so thoroughly settled that the citation of authori-
ties is unnecessary." In a recent case note appearing in 6 Indiana Law
Journal 402 (March, 1931) it was sought to be shown that, in view of
sections 725 and 426 of Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes 1926 which
provide that cases shall not be reversed for defects in the pleadings or
where it appears that the case was fairly tried and determined upon the
merits, and in view of the recent decisions giving effect to these statutes,
it is doubtful whether or not the theory of the complaint is still law in
Indiana. Apparently these statutes and decisions were overlooked in the
principal case as no mention is therein made of them. These statutes were
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overlooked in most of the older cases but many of the more recent decisions
have considered and given effect to them. It would be interesting to note
the outcome of a case in which both these statutes and the doctrine of the
theory of the case were properly urged. The situation at present seems
to be that whichever of these positions is brought to the attention of the
court is the one that controls its decision while the other is apparently not
considered. This probably accounts for the result reached in the principal
case.
It is again suggested that were the court forced to choose between the
aforementioned statutes and the doctrine of the theory of the case the
former might easily be held to prevail and the latter which has been the
butt of much criticism in recent years might definitely be repudiated. Here
is a situation in which certainty as to what the law is is of vast importance.
Whatever the final choice between the two competing rules, it seems highly
desirable that the law in Indiana be made clear to the profession once and
for all.
S. J. S.
WRIT OF CORAM NoBIs-DOUBLE JEOPARDY LIMITATIONS-Juan S. Lopez,
convicted on a criminal charge inthe Lake County Criminal Court, paid
his fine and served his sentence. Then he sought to obtain another trial, an
acquittal in which would both save him from deportation based on the con-
viction and free him of the stigma cast by it upon his reputation. When he
presented his petition to the aforementioned court for a writ of error
coram nobis, the court refused him permission to file the petition; and he
applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandate ordering the lower
court to let him file. Held, for petitioner. The writ of error coram nobis
is analogous to a new trial; in both types of procedure double jeopardy is
waived. State ex rel Lopez v. Killigrew and Smith, Supreme Court of
Indiana, February 20, 1931, 174 N. E. 808.
Jeopardy is held in most jurisdictions to begin when a jury is properly
impaneled and sworn in by a court of jurisdiction to try the defendant upon
an indictment duly found and formally adequate to sustain a conviction,
though things may happen during the course of the trial which will leave
the defendant subject to a trial before a new jury. People ex rel Stabile v.
Warden of City Prison of New York, 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911);
People ex rel Bullock v. Hayes, 151 N. Y. S. 1075, 109 N. E. 77 (1915).
Jeopardy does not attach in Indiana until the accused is put upon trial on
a legal indictment before a competent jury and a court of jurisdiction.
Klein vState, 151 Ind. 146; Warden v. Emmons, 83 Ind. 331. Conditions
subsequent, as it were, which may occur during trial and will terminate the
privilege of pleading double jeolardy in anothei trial for the same offense
include failure of jurors to agree (White v. State, 63 Fla. 49, 59 So. 17
(1912]); proper discharge of jury for inability to agree (People ex rel
Bullock supra; State v. Leach, 180 Ind. 124); withdrawal of case from jury
after discovering, following the swearing in, that one is disqualified (Mim-
yard v. State, 17 Ga. App. 398, 87 S. E. 710 [1916]); Adams v. State, 99
Ind. 244); discharge of jury on defendant's objection because of court's
failure to admonish them before separation (State v. McKinney, 76 Kan.
419, 91 P. 1068-1907). And, though statutory regulations in some states
